Introduction
This paper examines the ways in which Maori are recognised through New Zealand's legal and political institutions, and draws lessons that are applicable to the complex challenge of Indigenous constitutional recognition in Australia.
1 It argues that Indigenous recognition can occur through constitutional reform, but also through institutional and legislative reform: recognition could be a package of constitutional and other reforms. The New Zealand example demonstrates that Indigenous recognition seeks to address the functional, working relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state, to make it fairer than it has been in the past. It shows that Indigenous recognition can and should be practical and ongoing, rather than purely symbolic and static.
The paper begins by providing a political and theoretical context to the current Australian recognition debate. It discusses the reaction to the Expert Panel's recommendations, contextualises the relevant concepts including 'recognition', 'symbolism', 'practicality' and 'fairness' within the frame of a liberal democracy, and argues that Indigenous advocacy has always been for practical forms of constitutional recognition and constitutional guarantees. Part III draws impetus from former Prime Minister Tony Abbott's comments about the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand and compares the constitutional histories of New Zealand and Australia. It explores the changing constitutional relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state in both nations through successful or attempted agreement-making and breached promises, and argues that Indigenous constitutional recognition in the contemporary Australian setting should arise out of genuine negotiation and agreement between Indigenous peoples and the state, to re-set the terms for a fairer future relationship. Part IV discusses New Zealand's ongoing movement towards practical recognition of Maori through legislative and institutional reforms including the Maori Council, Waitangi Tribunal settlement mechanisms and the cultural recognition that has flowed therefrom, and Maori reserved parliamentary seats.
Part V draws specific lessons relevant to the challenges of Indigenous constitutional recognition in Australia, highlighting four key insights. First, that constitutional rights clauses are not the only way to constitutionally protect Indigenous rights: political and procedural mechanisms to give Indigenous people a participatory voice in their affairs can also be used. Second, that Australia could legislatively enact high-level agreed principles to better manage the future relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. Third, that Australian governments could pursue agreement-making and settlements with Indigenous peoples in a fuller and richer sense than is currently the case. Fourth, that Australia could enact legislative mechanisms for practical recognition of Indigenous cultures, languages and heritage.
Part VI concludes that New Zealand's functional approach to Maori recognition and reconciliation is useful to the current Australian debate. The New Zealand example encourages both practicality and creativity in ascertaining the right constitutional and other reforms to effect just recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australia, in a way that is compatible with and acceptable within our political and constitutional system and cirumstances.
II Political and Theoretical Context

A The Current Indigenous Recognition Debate
The difficulty of constitutional reform in Australia imposes arduous constraints on the types of reforms that are politically achievable. The Expert Panel's 2012 recommendations for Indigenous constitutional recognition proposed reforms including removal of references to 'race', insertion of a replacement Indigenous head of power incorporating preambular recognition statements, recognition of Indigenous languages and English as a national language, and the adoption of a racial non-discrimination clause to prohibit governments enacting racially discriminatory laws and policies.
2
Some of these recommendations proved controversial. The racial non-discrimination clause proposal in particular, despite its public popularity, 3 was derided as a 'one clause bill of rights' that would improperly empower unelected judges to overturn the decisions of elected representatives. 4 Downplaying these criticisms, the Joint Select Committee in 2015 recommended three versions of a racial nondiscrimination clause in its final report, including two versions that would protect Indigenous people only. 5 But soon after the report's publication, Committee Chairman, Liberal MP Ken Wyatt, indicated that a racial non-discrimination clause would be unlikely to gain the necessary political support for a successful referendum, because it was already being opposed in his own party. 6 It is thus becoming increasingly apparent that a racial non-discrimination clause, or variations thereof, may be politically unachievable. As bipartisan support is integral to referendum success, 7 modified proposals that might more easily win widespread political consensus are being discussed.
8
Political and procedural constitutional reform options, designed to increase Indigenous participation in democratic processes as a pre-emptive way of protecting Indigenous rights and interests, have been proposed as alternatives to judicially adjudicated constitutional rights clauses. Noel Pearson argues for a constitutional amendment to guarantee that Indigenous views are heard by Parliament in the making of laws and policies with respect to Indigenous affairs,
9
accompanied by a Declaration outside the Constitution to give effect to symbolic recognition in a way that is free from unintended constitutional consequences. 10 Others have argued for reserved Indigenous parliamentary seats.
11
Former Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, recently called for a treaty, which could then be constitutionally recognised.
12
Others, like Father Frank Brennan, argue for minimalist, purely symbolic recognition in the Constitution, because that is all he thinks is politically achievable. 13 Brennan suggests a 'modest' constitutional acknowledgement: a new preamble recognising Indigenous prior occupation, the 'continuing relationship with their traditional lands and waters' and the 'continuing cultures, languages and heritage' of Indigenous people, and a replacement Indigenous power framed in similar terms, but no form of constitutional guarantee.
14 Given the political constraints and legal complexities, and the range of options on the 
16
The argument for Indigenous recognition proceeds from an understanding that Indigenous peoples are a legitimately distinct 'constitutional entity', or constitutional constituency, within a plural legal order that can be seen to derive its authority from more than one source. 17 In the settlement of Australia, the sovereign status of Indigenous peoples was discriminatorily denied by the colonising forces and their status as a legitimate constitutional constituency similarly went unrecognised.
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Australia's Constitution was thus a union of the colonies, but it unfairly excluded Indigenous peoples both as equal citizens and as consenting parties to the constitutional compact. Had things been fairer, the Constitution might also have embodied a union with the colonised. Indigenous people might have been treated as equals and allowed to negotiate the terms of their inclusion in the new nation, rather than having those terms oppressively imposed upon them. This essentially 'liberal, consent-based' argument for Indigenous constitutional recognition therefore seeks to remedy the unfair and illiberal treatment of Indigenous peoples prior to and at federation, as well as the injustices that have flowed from that initial discrimination, by setting in place fairer terms for Indigenous inclusion and participation in the future.
18
Will Kymlicka's understanding of the issue is grounded in his observation that Western democracies are often multinational -they can be home to distinct yet coexisting nations or peoples, while also developing into unified states with a shared sense of patriotism. Kymlicka observes that accommodation and recognition of coexisting domestic nations within states is often accepted as a necessary measure, 'above and beyond the common rights of citizenship', to ensure that these nations can exist in a way that is fair, moral and respectful to their common humanity.
19
Noel Pearson characterises recognition and accommodation as a middle way between absolute assimilation and total fragmentation of the state as responses to the multinational or 'peoplehood' problem. 20 Indeed, the middle way of recognition and accommodation, as demonstrated in comparable liberal democracies such as Canada, the USA and New Zealand, may be the most humanitarian and peaceful way to reconcile colonised nations with colonising states. Such measures stand as an appropriate recognition of historical difference and a justifiable exception to strict equality before the law, because 'equality, including the just distribution of constitutional power, is enhanced by the construction and support of this difference.' 21 The pursuit of Indigenous constitutional recognition can be understood as the pursuit of reform to support equality in practice, taking into account historical and contemporary practical realities.
Coulthard however, in the Canadian context, problematises 'the increasingly commonplace assumption that the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the … state can be reconciled via a liberal "politics of recognition".' He argues that the 'recognition-based approach to reconciling Indigenous peoples' assertions of nationhood with settlerstate sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity-related claims … is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority.' 22 It is an analysis that aligns with arguments commonly made in the Australian context that Indigenous people should seek 'sovereignty', rather than mere recognition. 23 The argument views constitutional recognition as a subordinate acceptance of, rather than resistance to, colonial rule; it tends to equate recognition with continued oppression, and 'sovereignty' with independence, freedom and self-determination.
As Pearson suggests, however, constitutional recognition may be better understood as attempting to reconcile these extremes. Depending on the model adopted, recognition might mean a carving out of Indigenous authority and a sharing of power. In that sense, it could be a recognition of residual, surviving or co-existing sovereignty or nationhood. Australia's federal arrangements share authority and power between the Commonwealth and the states as a recognition of shared sovereignty. 24 If Indigenous peoples were also meaningfully and fairly represented and recognised within the constitutional union -could that actually amount to a practical recognition of surviving and coexisting Indigenous sovereignty?
25
Within this nuanced conversation, the difficulty in distinguishing between recognition measures that are fair and those that are unfair is readily apparent. As a starting point, fairness in a symbolic sense should be distinguished from fairness in practice. Sometimes, however, symbolism and practicality can collide and coincide. As Rosenberg points out, for example, constitutional bills of rights (often seen, particularly in the current Australian debate, as offering practical, substantive constitutional protections) can sometimes be pursued for their symbolic value more than for their operational results. Professor Suri Ratnapala notes that 'over 130 countries have a bill of rights in one form or another but only a minority of them can truly claim a reasonable record of respect for human rights.' 26 Observing a potential danger in pursuing litigation alone as a strategy for human rights protection, Rosenberg observes: Symbolic victories may be mistaken for substantive ones, covering a reality that is distasteful. Rather than working to change that reality, reformers may be misled (or content?) to celebrate the illusion of change. There is a danger that symbolic gains cover for actual failings.
27
That is certainly a risk in the pursuit of Indigenous constitutional recognition in Australia. Would the insertion of a racial non-discrimination clause really yield equality of outcomes and equality in practice, or would it be more of a symbolic statement with occasional practical effect? Conversely, might a preamble, intended to have only symbolic effect, eventually yield practical (even if unintended) reform, perhaps through its use in judicial interpretation? Or might symbolic statements engender attitudinal changes which can eventually prompt practical reform? As the New Zealand example demonstrates through the Treaty of Waitangi, sometimes a form of recognition that is of itself lacking in legally enforceable power can nonetheless, over time, prompt significant practical change through the moral and political authority that it comes to wield and the political and cultural change it encourages.
28
It can be given practical substance when its principles are translated into legislative action. The danger, of course, is in settling for symbolism that does not and perhaps never will prompt practical change.
The Apology to Australia's Indigenous Peoples, for example, was not accompanied by any practical measures or financial compensation. 29 Pearson has argued that accepting the Apology without compensation was a strategic mistake. His fear was that 'Black fellas will get the words, the white fellas will keep the money. And by Thursday the stolen generations and their apology will be over as a political issue.' 30 Pearson's anxiety in this regard turned out to be well-founded -compensation was never paid and the Apology turned out to be purely symbolic.
31
The lesson remains salient for current Indigenous struggles to achieve constitutional recognition that is more than mere words and that includes fair reforms to propel positive practical change. 
35
Constitutional recognition seeks to address the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state, to make it fairer than it has been in the past. This cannot be achieved through symbolism alone: it requires a practical change to some constitutional rules.
The rules, procedures and principles in Australia's Constitution are best characterised as enduring, intergenerational guarantees. The harder a Constitution is to change, the more this is true -Australia's is one of the hardest to change in the world. New Zealand's comparatively flexible constitutional arrangements must be taken into account when applying Maori recognition insights to Australia's much more difficult to amend Constitution. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that Australia need not implement all its Indigenous recognition measures in the Constitution. Some reforms might properly be implemented through legislation. That would mean that the referendum requirement can be avoided, but it would also mean that the legislation is vulnerable to amendment or repeal.
If Indigenous recognition in Australia can be a package of constitutional and legislative reforms, part of the challenge will be in ascertaining which reforms are best effected in legislation and which reforms need the entrenched status of a constitutional guarantee.
C The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand
The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, on one view, was a moment of historical accord which laid the groundwork for 'harmonious race relations' between Maori and Pakeha people. 54 The Treaty has been described as 'the promise of two peoples to take the best possible care of each other.'
55
Despite this aspiration, New Zealand's history 'since the signing of the Treaty has been marked by repeated failures to honour these founding promises.'
56
While the Treaty's promises were often abandoned by the much more powerful Crown, the Treaty nonetheless established a special relationship between Maori and the Crown. This in itself was important. The Treaty's 'text reflects an understanding of the fundamental elements of the relationship and about how iwi and hapū would work with the Crown in developing the country's future.' 57 It was an acknowledgement of shared founding authority and agreement to work towards a partnered future. This understanding proved key to the development of institutional structures recognising this special relationship.
The Treaty itself, however, can be described as legally mostly ineffective, as laws can be passed which contravene the Treaty. 58 It is only enforceable where expressly incorporated into legislation. 59 Most would agree, however, that the Treaty has become socio-politically and morally effective. Over time as politics and mindsets have changed, the Treaty has helped shift national attitudes towards a greater respect towards Maori rights, and Maori are seen politically as something more akin to equal Treaty partners.
60
The Treaty's preamble acknowledges the British monarchy, the native prior occupants and immigrants, and is said to establish a bicultural foundation for New Zealand. 61 The preamble establishes the Treaty's purpose as protecting Maori rights and property, recognising British sovereign authority and establishing law and order and conditions for justice, for both the native population and the Crown's subjects.
Article One declares that the native chiefs cede their sovereignty and authority absolutely and without reservation to the British Crown (although this is disputed, as the Maori text of the Treaty employs a concept that differs from the English concept of 'sovereignty'). 62 Article Two guarantees the Indigenous tribes 'full exclusive and undisturbed' possession of their properties as long as they wish to retain those properties; but says that the tribes yield to the Crown the exclusive and pre-emptive right of alienation at agreed prices. 63 Article Three says that 'in consideration therefore' the Crown grants the Maori 'royal protection' and imparts 'all the rights and privileges of British subjects'. It guarantees Maori equal citizenship and equality before the law, but may also establish a duty of protection whereby the Crown is supposed to act in the best interests of Maori people.
64
The Treaty, however, did not prevent racial discrimination against Maori people. 65 Views that saw the Maori as an inferior race led courts in 1877 to declare the Treaty legally invalid. 66 The racially discriminatory attitudes of the era viewed the Maori as 'savages' and 'uncivilised barbarians', not possessing any sovereignty prior to colonisation. Accordingly, Maori were considered politically incapable of having entered into a valid Treaty with the Crown and were deemed incapable of retaining rights to land and property:
67
On the foundation of this colony the aborigines [sic] were found without any kind of civil government, or any settled system of law… The Maori tribes were incapable of performing the duties, and therefore of assuming the rights, of a civilised community…
On the cession of territory by one civilised power to another, the rights of private property are invariably respected, and the old law of the country is administered, to such extent as may be necessary, by the courts of the new sovereign. ... But in the case of primitive barbarians, the supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice.
68
The discriminatory logic of terra nullius initially prevailed in New Zealand, 69 as it did in Australia, despite the Treaty. it was a genuine bargain struck out of political and practical necessity on both sides.
77
In any case, the treaty was soon declared invalid by the colonial authorities.
78 Henry Reynolds explains the reasoning of the colonial lawyers of the time. Because the colonisers had 'gained ultimate dominion in and sovereignty over the soil,' the Indigenous people only retained a 'right of occupancy' -not ownership. The colonisers asserted that they were sovereign, so allowing Indigenous people rights to sell the land directly to the settlers would have been inconsistent with the rights of the Crown to retain 'sovereignty and dominion' over the land. 79 The concept of the inalienability of native land thus emerged, not from colonial good will, but as 'a restraint on the natives' power of choice and control of their land for the purpose of reserving power and control of land for the new sovereign,' 80 thus allowing the Imperial government to control how land was alienated instead of allowing Indigenous people to strike bargains with the settlers for themselves.
81
It cannot be said with certainty whether the Batman treaty was a genuine attempt at negotiating a deal or an attempt to dupe the Indigenous people. But it seems evident that the two parties had been trying to negotiate. The logic of terra nullius was ingenious in how it played out in this respect. By denying that the Indigenous people possessed any sovereignty or ownership of the land, the Crown denied them their right to negotiate with respect to their own colonisation.
A similar insight is applicable to the constitutional negotiations that preceded Australia's Federation. Indigenous peoples, under the logic of terra nullius, were not seen as sovereign entities nor as owners of the land. Thus, they were not included as legitimate negotiating parties to the constitutional compact. Where Maori prior sovereignty was initially recognised through the Treaty of Waitangi (even if it was later denied) and the key promises of equal citizenship and respect for property were made (even if they were later ignored), the Indigenous peoples of Australia were not dealt with as sovereign entities in the founding of Australia, and the key guarantees with respect to equal treatment and property were not articulated. The pragmatic imperatives of settlement meant that the liberal democratic principles of equality before the law and respect for property rights were ignored in respect of the Indigenous people whom the English sought to colonise.
82
How different might things have been had this not been the case -if Indigenous people had been allowed to negotiate and settle the terms to govern their future relationship with the newcomers. 83 Abbott is right that things indeed happened more fairly across the Tasman. The key promises of the Treaty of Waitangi were not always kept; but at least they were made. The principles were agreed and established, and this in itself was important. It meant that the Maori were able to hold the Crown accountable to these promises over time.
The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from power sharing and constitutional negotiations was not for lack of Indigenous people trying. Batman's attempted treaty was, if nothing else, an attempt at negotiation. Similarly, the historical accounts relayed in the Mabo 84 judgement show that Indigenous people did indeed try to exercise agency and political authority over their lands and to negotiate deals that might ensure their survival and ongoing ownership in the face of creeping dispossession. The Mabo judgement quotes Governor King's account of early negotiations with Aboriginal people in 1804:
They very ingenuously answered that they did not like to be driven from the few places that were left on the banks of the river, where alone they could procure food … that if they could retain some places from the lower part of the river they should be satisfied and would not trouble the white men. The observation and request appear to be so just and equitable that I assured them no more settlements should be made lower down the river.
85
The account again suggests that an informal deal was struck; a promise was made by the Governor. 86 Like many such
Crown promises, however, it was soon abandoned in the face of practical pressures: 'in due course the Governor's assurance … was dishonoured. While the wrongs involved in the dispossession of the Aboriginals were acknowledged, the underlying problems were left unaddressed.'
87
The most fundamental of the pre-Federation promises were the unilateral ones in the form of the royal instructions given by the King to Captain Cook and Arthur Phillip when they made their journeys to colonise Australia. Captain James Cook on his exploration voyages carried secret instructions from the British King, authorising Cook to 'take possession of convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great Britain', but 'with the consent of the natives'. Constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples is a way to belatedly make good those unfulfilled historical promises and complete the unreciprocated and unrealised attempts at constitutional negotiation. In arriving at a fair form of Indigenous recognition, the need for genuine negotiation between Indigenous peoples and the state cannot be ignored. Only genuine negotiation can lead to free agreement and a just settlement between Indigenous peoples and government, which can then be implemented through constitutional and legislative measures.
IV Movement towards Maori Practical Recognition
The 
97
The fiduciary principle has emerged as a duty to consult which, though not legally actionable, has developed moral and political force. Treaty principles are now incorporated into several pieces of legislation.
98
Practical measures for Maori recognition have been implemented to ensure the Maori voice is heard through specific national institutional arrangements. These include the Maori Council, the settlement mechanisms of the Waitangi Tribunal which have helped propel practical forms of Maori cultural recognition, and reserved Maori parliamentary seats.
A Maori Council
The Maori Council structure arose out of Maori political advocacy in the 1800s, and derived its shape from the Kotahitanga (Maori King) movement and the Maori parliaments. Maori districts cover the entire country and territorially coexist with the general roll.
One view is that the Maori seats were initially implemented as a tool for political control and minimisation of Maori power, as Maori in the 1860s were in the majority. 133 Lloyd explains:
At a time when Maori greatly outnumbered non-Maori, dedicated seats allowed the political power of Maori to be constrained, limiting their vote to the Maori electoral roll and the four Maori seats alone.
134
Others argue that the reserved seats were implemented to address the problem that the Maori were disenfranchised because of the property rules that were a condition of voting rights. Only males over 21 with an individual property title were allowed to vote. 135 The Maori practiced communal ownership, 136 and though they could undertake processes to gain individual title, this was slow and many were mistrustful of aggressive Crown tactics to individualise Maori title as a way of eroding Maori governance and authority.
137
Accordingly, many Maori men who should otherwise have been allowed to vote were not democratically represented.
138
The allocation of reserved seats was initially a temporary measure, purportedly to ensure that the Maori were represented while governments undertook the process of giving Maori males individual property titles. New Zealand is paralleled in the Australian debate about the compatibility of Indigenous recognition with the principle of equality before the law in a liberal democracy.
164
The principle of equality before the law, however, is not cut and dry. Liberalism allows for positive measures to ensure equality of opportunities and fair and equal participation given the historical and contemporary circumstances. For example, 'special measures' at international law, the positive expression of the racial non-discrimination principle, allow for affirmative measures to promote equal opportunities and address past discrimination, to ensure that all groups have equal enjoyment of their human rights, particularly given past denial of rights. 165 In New Zealand, positive measures like reserved seats can be justified not only as a manifestation of an original sovereignty-sharing agreement, but also (since there is dispute about the correct meaning and terms of this agreement) as a measure to equalise a historically imbalanced power relationship.
New Zealand has no entrenched Constitution, no entrenched bill of rights and the Treaty is not legally binding unless legislated, which is subject to political will. Australia too must think through how best to protect Indigenous rights and interests in our own constitutional arrangements. Which kind of guarantee is politically achievable and best for Australia: a judicially adjudicated racial non-discrimination guarantee, or a political and procedural guarantee that Indigenous voices will be heard and represented in the political process?
V Lessons for Australia
A Judicially Interpreted Constitutional Rights Clauses are not the Only Solution
Australia's parliamentary supremacy is limited by our Constitution, but the Constitution contains no bill of rights and has been largely ineffective in protecting the rights of Australia's most disadvantaged minority -Indigenous people. It is not just the lack of rights clauses that is a problem. There is also no representation of Indigenous peoples as a polity within our check-and-balance federalism.
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If Australia's Constitution mostly protects citizens' rights through democratic procedures and federal power sharing, then Indigenous people have decisively missed out on that political and procedural protection.
It is true that Indigenous people can (now at least) vote like all other citizens. But being only three per cent of the population, Indigenous people hardly get an influential say in Parliament, even on matters directly concerning them. Arguably, past racial discrimination has occurred because Parliaments have never been good at listening to minority Indigenous views. This is why Indigenous advocates have for decades sought constitutional reform and recognition: because constitutional guarantees are a way of tempering majoritarian rule. 166 Constitutional recognition could implement a stable and enduring constitutional guarantee that the discrimination of the past will not be repeated, and that the Indigenous relationship with the state will be fairer than it has been historically.
The solution proposed by the Expert Panel and the Joint Select Committee was that a racial non-discrimination clause be adopted in the Constitution. 167 However, this proposal has been criticised on the grounds that it would undermine parliamentary supremacy and give too much power to the judiciary. 168 Given that bipartisan support is crucial for referendum success, 169 these objections must be contended with. If a racial non-discrimination clause is not the answer to the challenge of protecting Indigenous rights and interests within Australia's constitutional system, then what is a better solution? 170 How can we maintain parliamentary supremacy, while ensuring that Indigenous rights and interests are fairly protected?
It may be that, like New Zealand, we should turn our minds to more democratic, institutional and procedural solutions.
Could that mean a set of reserved Indigenous seats? In my view that is a doubtful political possibility. Might, then, it be an Indigenous Australian version of the Maori Council, perhaps with constitutional status?
Indigenous advocates for decades have argued for Indigenous representation and a voice within federal parliamentary procedures. 171 The best, and most politically achievable, way to implement a guaranteed Indigenous voice in Indigenous affairs may be through a constitutionally mandated Indigenous representative body. 172 If drafted to be a non-justiciable, political and procedural amendment, as suggested by Professor Anne Twomey, 173 this option could give effect to Indigenous aspirations for a guaranteed voice and representation in their affairs, while respecting parliamentary supremacy and avoiding the possibility of laws being struck down.
174
Learning from the Maori Council experience, legislative flexibility can be maintained in the design, composition and details of the body. Parliament could retain the flexibility to evolve and update the institution as necessary.
But if a successful referendum to implement this kind of constitutional amendment were achieved, the constitutional imperative for the Indigenous voice in Indigenous affairsand the political authority derived from the endorsement of the Australian people through a successful referendumwould always remain.
175
B Set in Place High-Level Principles for a Fairer Future Relationship
The Treaty of Waitangi has come to carry moral and political power, even though it is, of itself, legally unenforceable.
176
In that sense, it could be viewed as a symbolic statement of agreed principles that over time has come into practical fruition. Though a non-legal document, the Treaty is now considered New Zealand's founding constitutional document 177 and is considered 'quasi-constitutional'. The
Treaty has been integral in allowing Maori to hold the Crown accountable to its promises over time.
Could Australia put in place similarly agreed principles, arising out of Indigenous-state negotiations, that should govern a fairer future relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state? If all the relevant principles cannot be constitutionally entrenched, perhaps they could be effected in legislation as well? Could an Australian Statute of Reconciliation over the years come to carry similar political and moral authority as the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand? Could its principles similarly come into practical fruition?
Freeman and Leeser propose an extra-constitutional Declaration to effect Indigenous recognition: a 'historical and aspirational statement of no more than 300 words,' subject to a popular vote to ensure political legitimacy, 178 as part of a potential package of reforms effecting Indigenous recognition. Perhaps this idea can be combined with and strengthened through inclusion of the Declaration in a 194 as part of the package of reforms. 195 The settlements that occur in Australia through the native title
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regime could be expanded to include cultural redress, an accounting of history and formal apologies, in addition to land and financial compensation. If this process were pursued wholeheartedly, it could significantly affect our sense of national self-esteem in Indigenous affairs. It could also help propel practical recognition of Indigenous languages and heritage, as has occurred in New Zealand. New Zealand has succeeded in making Maori heritage a celebrated part of New Zealand's national identity. Australia can do the same through practical cultural recognition measures effected through legislation and policy. This should be part of the Indigenous recognition package.
D
VI Conclusion
The broad lesson from New Zealand is that Indigenous recognition is a practical, not just a symbolic, reform challenge. The New Zealand comparison encourages us to think practically and creatively in our search for the appropriate, politically viable solutions for fair forms of Indigenous constitutional recognition. Recognition can and should mean much more than a new, symbolic preamble to the Constitution. It should address the working, operational relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state, through constitutional and legislative reforms that should arise out of genuine negotiations between Indigenous peoples and the state.
The New Zealand example also demonstrates that judicially adjudicated constitutional rights clauses are not the only way to protect Indigenous rights and interests. Indigenous rights protection can also occur through procedural and political mechanisms. If lack of political consensus and attachment to parliamentary supremacy prevents the implementation of an entrenched protection against racial discrimination to protect Indigenous minority interests in Australia, perhaps the reforms for Indigenous constitutional recognition could include an Indigenous representative body, constitutionally authorised to engage with the state on Indigenous matters. 
